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ABSTRACT
Due to geopolitical location, North-Eastern Polish regions (voivodships) have a big potential for the development of cross-border 
cooperation. This kind of international activity can have impact on regional development. Polish authorities on the central, regional 
and local levels initiate, run and co-finance cross-border projects designed to promote integration, understanding and co-operation 
across the border. According to the aims of the Polish foreign policy the basis of the long-term strategy of regional development of 
the North-Eastern Poland could be its geographical position and long-established co-operation with Kaliningrad Oblast. Institutional 
framework of contacts are: intergovernmental agreements, agreements establishing Euroregions, agreements between regional and 
local authorities. The cross-border cooperation between Warmia and Mazury Region and the Kaliningrad Oblast could be important 
part of the Polish foreign policy towards Russia. 
KEYWORDS: Cross-border cooperation, Kaliningrad Oblast, Warmia and Mazury Region, Foreign Policy of Poland, Polish-
Russian Relations.
JEL CODES: F5 
Introduction
The aim of the paper is to analyze the role of Kaliningrad Oblast (Kaliningrad Region) in Polish foreign 
policy after 1989, with special emphasis on cross-border cooperation between Poland and the Russian Fed-
eration. The main research methods used are: method of system, institutional and political science methods. 
The process of disintegration of the Soviet Union has led not only to the geopolitical changes in Europe 
and in the world, but also to the fact that the issue of the Kaliningrad Oblast became the subject of interest 
from countries and international organizations. The Russian exclave has been the subject of debate and po-
litical controversy both in Russia and in Europe. Initially it was a result of the militarization of Kaliningrad 
Oblast and speculation regarding the change in its status. Later, the issue of Kaliningrad Oblast appeared 
primarily in the context of the enlargement of the European Union and NATO to the east. The importance of 
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the Russian exclave should be considered not only in terms of geopolitical location, but mainly in the context 
of political, economic or military conditions. It is worth to pay special attention to disputes concerning the 
status of Kaliningrad Oblast and its role within the Russian Federation. Disputes which took place both at the 
federal level in Moscow, as well as one regional level in Kaliningrad. In these debates two main visions were 
developed. The first one focused on maintaining the status of the Kaliningrad Oblast as a “military base” in 
Europe, with some structural changes and with maintaining close relations with Russia. The second one, in 
turn, stressed the importance of establishment of free economic zone with increasing economic independ-
ence and political of the exclave.
These two concepts were largely a result of differences in geopolitical considerations about the role of 
the Baltic Sea Region in Russian foreign policy. The first one has its roots in anti-Western attitude. Repre-
sentatives of this option perceive Russian Baltic policy, above all, in the context of protecting the rights of 
Russian-speaking minority in the Baltic republics. According to their opinion, reducing the military contin-
gent stationed in Kaliningrad Oblast could lead to loss of control by Moscow in the region of Central and 
Eastern Europe and weaken the security of the Russian Federation. Supporters of the second, pro-Western 
option, perceived Baltic region in the context of cooperation with Western states and institutions. In their 
view, such cooperation should become a priority of Russian foreign policy (Lichacziein, 2000; Sergounin, 
2003). They called for reducing the number of troops in the Baltic region and to intensify contacts with 
neighboring countries, also in the framework of the Council of Baltic Sea States. An attempt to reconcile 
these two options was a trend that could be for the purposes of article described as realistic. Since taking 
power by Vladimir Putin this trend prevailed both in Russian foreign policy in the Baltic region as well as in 
Moscow policy towards the Kaliningrad Oblast.
On economic determinants of the Kaliningrad Oblast undoubtedly influenced the establishment of the 
Free Economic Zone “Yantar” in 1991. However, despite signs of economic recovery, the project has not 
ultimately brought the expected economic and social results. In 1996 the Russian authorities , in place of the 
FEZ “Yantar”, introduced Special Economic Zone “Yantar”. The introduction of a special economic zone 
regime has not led to a significant increase of interest on the Kaliningrad Oblast from the side of foreign 
investors. The plan to use convenient location of Kaliningrad seaport failed to end. Much more funds were 
transferred to the development of the seaport of St. Petersburg.
After the collapse of the USSR, the Kaliningrad Oblast as a Russian exclave has been the subject of 
interest from Polish and other Baltic Sea states. Kaliningrad issue, however, was not the priority problem in 
the relations of these countries with the Russian Federation, but the most significant place it played in Lith-
uanian-Russian relations. This was due to the following factors: military potential gathered in Kaliningrad 
Oblast, a Russian transit through the territory of Lithuania or the issue of the so-called “Lithuania Minor”. 
German policy towards the Kaliningrad Oblast since the early 90s was characterized by caution. The position 
of the German authorities on the issue of Kaliningrad was consistent with the policy of the European Union. 
Germany supported the activities enhancing the socio-economic development of the exclave, among others 
through the EU aid programmes in the framework of TACIS programme. Officially, Germany declaring re-
straint on the policy towards the Kaliningrad Oblast conducted at the same time quite extensive cooperation 
with this entity of the Russian Federation. It pointed particularly to the German commitment to cooperation 
in the sphere of economy and trade. Germany was next to Poland and Lithuania the most important trading 
partner of the Kaliningrad Oblast. In the case of the Nordic countries it must be emphasized that the most 
active in cooperation with the exclave was Sweden and Denmark. Finland and Norway showed less activity 
in turn. The Nordic countries perceived the Kaliningrad Oblast primarily through the prism of cooperation 
in the field of environmental protection, health, civil society development and local democracy. Kaliningrad 
Oblast became the subject of interest also from non-state actors, primarily the EU and NATO. Baltic sub-
regional organizations, e.g. The Council of the Baltic Sea played, in turn, the role of forum where interested 
parties put their demands in relation to the Russian exclave (See: Oldberg, 2002; Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, 2002).
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1. New priorit ies of Polish Foreign Policy after 1989
Before 1989, the foreign policy of Poland was primarily subordinated to the interests of the Soviet Un-
ion as a part of the East Bloc. The geopolitical changes, brought about by the collapse of the Yalta-Potsdam 
order, resulted in Poland’s being able to redefine the priorities of its foreign policy. Following the system 
transformation, the leading political parties reached a consensus concerning its main objectives. Polish po-
litical elites, including post-communists, finally agreed on the Euro-Atlantic direction; the policy was proved 
successful by Poland’s accession to NATO in 1999 and to the European Union in 2004 (See: Zięba, 2000). 
As a consequence of the collapse of the USSR, Czechoslovakia and unification of Germany, Poland found 
itself in a completely new geopolitical situation, surrounded by new neighbours: the Russian Federation, 
Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Germany. Of particular importance for the 
Polish foreign policy were the relationships with the two regional powers – Russia and Germany – and with 
Ukraine, which was perceived by the Polish authorities as an important stabilising factor in the region. In 
1990’s Poland redefined its new relationships with its eastern neighbours, especially with Russia. Polish at-
tempts to join NATO met with fierce opposition from the Russian authorities. Moscow argued that NATO 
expansion eastwards would disturb the balance of power in the region, posing a threat to the Russian Federa-
tion itself. Poland’s accession to the European Union did not raise such objections from its neighbour from 
the east. However, one should remember about the reservations raised by Russia concerning the necessity 
to introduce visas for the Russian citizens, inhabiting one of its regions, the Kaliningrad Oblast, which is an 
exclave, separated from the remaining part of Russia by the territory of Poland and Lithuania. 
The beginning of the 21st century provided also challenges for Poland associated with the membership 
in the EU, but also in terms of creating new eastern policy. Poland supported reforms towards democ-
racy, especially in Ukraine and also opposition movements in Belarus. Former Polish President Aleksander 
Kwaśniewski and the president of Lithuania, Valdas Adamkus, got actively involved in solving a political 
conflict in Ukraine during the “Orange Revolution” in late in 2004 and early 2005. President Kwaśniewski 
represented not only Poland, but he had the official support from the European Union. Polish participation 
in the “Orange Revolution” was fiercely criticised by the Russian Federation, which saw Polish involvement 
as interference in Ukraine’s internal affairs. What is noteworthy, however, is that Russia also took active part 
in the events. President Vladimir Putin visited Ukraine twice before the first and second round of the vote, 
openly supporting one of the candidates and the camp of president Leonid Kuchma. Russia had and still 
has important economic and political interests in Ukraine. Ukraine is a country through which oil and gas 
pipelines run. One of the elements of the Polish eastern policy are its efforts aimed at strengthening the ties 
between Ukraine and Georgia on the one side and the EU and NATO on the other and, in the longer perspec-
tive, even the membership of those countries in the Euro-Atlantic structures. During NATO meetings Poland 
supported the efforts of Ukraine and Georgia to become members of the Alliance in future.
One of the most important challenges for the Polish diplomacy after 1989 was development of economic 
and political relationships with the Russian Federation. It is important for Poland that in contacts with Russia 
and cross-border cooperation should be promoted, especially that with the Kaliningrad Oblast – the only area 
where both countries have a common border (Chełminiak, Kotowicz, Modzelewski, 2006; Gorzelak, 2002; 
Palmowski, 2007). Poland doesn’t have any claims to the Kaliningrad Oblast. Polish government recognizes 
rights of the Russian Federation to this territory. Most of Polish politicians stressed that significance reduc-
tion of Russian troops in the Kaliningrad Oblast and even demilitarization of this region would be good move 
from a perspective of Polish national interest. For Polish-Russian relations it’s important question how to 
develop cross-border cooperation between North-Eastern regions of Poland, especially Warmia and Mazury 
Region and Kaliningrad Oblast (Modzelewski, 2004). In the last 20 years, there were several problems in 
Polish-Russian relations which were connected with Kaliningrad, for example: the idea of building a Russian 
transnational corridor from Belarus to Kaliningrad between Polish territory.
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2. International conditions of Polish-Russian cross-border cooperation
Before 2004 , in the context of the forthcoming Polish integration with the EU for the Polish-Russian 
borderland important issue was a introduction of visas for Russians. The consultation on the regulation of 
this issue began in March 2000. The Polish authorities in February 2002 announced that it will introduce visa 
requirement in July 2003. The Russian side referred to these announcements in a critical way. Eventually, the 
deadline for their introduction of visas was postponed to 1 October 2003. On this day Poland renounced the 
agreement on free-visa mode concerning crossing the Polish-Russian border.
The introduction of visas had important consequences for cooperation on the Polish eastern border, 
including the Polish-Russian border: firstly, border formalities were certainly troublesome for crossing the 
external border of the European Union, but did not become an obstacle to the development of cross-border 
cooperation; Secondly, during the first 20 months when visas were in force on the Polish eastern border there 
has been a significant reduction in incoming traffic to Poland.
After the Polish accession to the European structures it was important that the Polish-Russian border 
does not become again a barrier to cooperation (See: Kukliński, 1999).
Poland after the EU accession issues of cross-border cooperation with the Kaliningrad Oblast raised also 
move on the international regional forum (See: Grzelak, 2002; Mrozowska, 2005). One of such organiza-
tion was the Council of Baltic Sea States. On 1 July 2004, shortly after joining the EU, Poland took over the 
presidency in this organizations. Representatives of the Polish government emphasized that the main priori-
ties of the Polish presidency, among others, would be cross-border and interregional co-operation including 
the “new neighbors of the EU”, especially with the Kaliningrad Oblast. Poland also pointed the need for joint 
actions in the framework of the Union of the Baltic Cities (mainly bilateral cooperation of twin cities) and 
the Euroregions.
After the Polish accession to the EU still (despite the development of new Euroregions “Szeszupa” 
(“Šešupė”) and “Łyna – Ława” (“Lyna – Lawa”), a leading role in cross-border cooperation of the Warmia 
and Mazury Region (voivodship) and the Kaliningrad Oblast played a Euroregion “Baltic”. It was created 
primarily to increase the level of cooperation from bilateral to multilateral. Another important condition of 
its creation was possibility of more attraction of the European Union funds. The level of use of the EU funds 
reached over 90 %, and in this respect Euroregion “Baltic” was a leading Polish Euroregion. The vast major-
ity of funds have been earmarked for projects involving the exchange of youth and children, university co-
operation (e.g. the University of Gdansk and the Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University in Kaliningrad), 
training camps, scout camps and assistance for the disabled.
The EU has supported the development of cross-border cooperation among others through a Neighbor-
hood Progamme Poland – Lithuania – Kaliningrad (INTERREG III A / TACIS), which was implemented in 
years 2004–2006 (See: Russo, 2012). Funds from the European Regional Development Fund received by 
the Warmia and Mazury Region in the INTERREG III A / TACIS amounted to 4.8 million EUR what ac-
counted for 14 % of national funds. For this sum, nearly 1.6 million EUR received projects for the develop-
ment of tourism and tourist infrastructure and the modernization of cultural heritage objects of cross-border 
importance. More than 1 million EUR has been earmarked for activities at the state border, including the 
development of infrastructure in the seaport of Elbląg. The remaining funds earmarked for projects related 
to environmental protection.
In recent years, major project supporting the cooperation of the Warmia and Mazury Region and the 
Kaliningrad Oblast was the ENPI Cross-Border Cooperation Programme Lithuania-Poland-Russia 2007–
2013. Its aim was to strengthen contacts between Poland, Russia and Lithuania by intensifying bilateral 
and trilateral cooperation. The program offered support for socio-economic development and increasing 
the quality of life of residents throughout the area covered by it. 60 projects for a total of nearly 100 mil-
lion EURwere implemented, of which the largest part was implemented by entities from the Warmia and 
Mazury Region (26).
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It is worth to mention that partnership agreements with local governments from Kaliningrad Oblast 
signed totally 39 local authorities from the Warmia and Mazury Region: 11 counties (out of 21) and 28 mu-
nicipalities (out of 116).
The last significant adjustment is the Polish-Russian Intergovernmental Agreement on Local Border Traf-
fic, signed in Moscow on 14 December 2011. It entered into force on 27 July 2012. It defines the principles of 
mutual journeys of border residents, covering an area of administration subdivisions of both countries, listed 
in Annex 1 of the Agreement. On the Russian side is the whole territory of the Kaliningrad Oblast, and on 
the Polish side – part of the Pomerania Region (4 counties and the Tri-City-Gdańsk, Sopot and Gdynia) and 
a part of Warmia and Mazury Region (11 counties, Olsztyn and Elbląg). Totally, the zone of Polish-Russian 
border traffic took about 2.8 million people, of which 1.9 million are Polish citizens and more than 0.9 mil-
lion are Russian citizens.
Supporting of local border traffic is one of the most important objectives of Polish foreign policy in 
regard to its eastern neighbors from outside of the European Union (Dudzińska, Dyner, 2013). The small 
border traffic would be a measure to overcome divisions, xenophobic attitudes, shaping the basis of mutual 
cooperation and thus enhancing stability and security and development, especially in the eastern Polish 
border regions. Diplomacy created at the lower level can play an important role than central state level, and 
relating directly to the cross-border cooperation which is a special kind of international cooperation, treated 
as part of the state’s foreign activity.
The Polish-Russian local border traffic has been a success in the social, economic and cultural sphere. It 
may be a “litmus paper” of mutual official relations.
3.  Polit ical  conditions of Polish-Russian cross-border cooperation
Political conditions of the cooperation of the Warmia and Mazury Region with Russian partner include 
Polish-Russian cooperation at the intergovernmental level and central level. In the opinion of representatives 
of local governments who are engaged in the cross-border cooperation any political tensions between War-
saw and Moscow affects on the local and regional levels, e.g. on rhythm and fluency checks at border cross-
ing points. It can specify in the following way: if official international relationship are better, then it is easier 
for local cooperation. A counter-example of this may be events in Ukraine and Crimea in 2014 and 2015 after 
which Polish-Russian relations were cooled and introduction of hindrances took place (informally), e.g. for 
Polish transport companies in the Kaliningrad Oblast.
Analyzing the political conditions for cross-border cooperation on the Polish-Russian borderland it needs 
to pay attention to the system of local and regional authorities in the entities of the Russian Federation. From 
a legal analysis of the Constitution of Russian Federation, federal laws and the Charter of Kaliningrad Oblast 
shows that the highest organ of state power of the Kaliningrad Oblast is a Government. It is a constantly 
acting as executive authority, headed by the Governor. The Governor is a key political figure in Kaliningrad 
Oblast. It is believed that due to the broad authority, particularly in terms of the economy, e.g. granting of 
concessions to exploit natural resources, disputing tenders for import quotas, the Governor gets the main 
financial resources of the region, which in Russian conditions determines the impact on the internal political 
scene.
The cooperation between the north-eastern Polish regions, especially the Warmia and Mazury Region 
and the Kaliningrad Oblast had a positive impact on reconciliation of geopolitical and economic interests of 
both parties. However, when issues of economic cooperation are analysed, it should be noted that the Russian 
exclave – contrary to the hopes of the Polish side – did not become a catalyst for the entire Polish-Russian 
economic co-operation , or a “window “ into the Russian market. The border with the Kaliningrad Oblast 
connects Poland, not so much with the main Russian market but with the Kaliningrad regional market (See: 
Zieliński, 2012).
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Cooperation at the investigated borderland, despite of existing barriers, should be defined as an intense, 
at the same time rational, focused on the implementation of joint projects with the use of the EU funds. In 
this respect, natural and touring values determine activities related mainly to tourism, culture and sport. One 
of the identified benefits of the cooperation is taking common challenges and resolve common problems (e.g. 
in infrastructure).
It is worth to note that the Polish membership in the European Union and the introduction of visa regime 
has so far not affected essentially for the continuation of a dynamic collaboration of the Warmia and Mazury 
Region with the Kaliningrad Oblast. Local governments, in most, treat foreign activity as a part of their 
socio-economic development, and the Polish-Russian neighborhood as an important factor in this process. 
The joint application for the EU funds for the implementation of cross-border projects and their implementa-
tion, results for a state of economic development of a municipality or county.
According to the idea of cross-border cooperation promoted for many years in Western Europe, it is 
intended shaping security and building mutual confidence. It seems that, given the current not-so-good po-
litical relations between Poland and Russia, the cross-border cooperation has a special meaning and sig-
nificance. At the same time an important objective of cross-border cooperation is eliminating obstacles and 
problems that may share border regions and making a mutual effort to neutralize the negative aspects of 
remoteness. For this reason, the proper use of Polish-Russian neighborhood is an opportunity that must be 
properly utilized.
The cross-border cooperation between Poland and Kaliningrad Oblast should be particularly important 
for Polish foreign policy after the last EU enlargement (See: Kawałko, 2006; Kruszewska-Gagoś, 2006). 
The experience of the functioning of the EU shows that the most effective is cooperation on the level of 
municipalities and counties. It is necessary in this case, however, financial and institutional support from the 
central government.
Conclusions
The end of the “Cold War” and the formation of the new order in Europe contributed so fundamentally to 
change the geopolitical significance of Kaliningrad Oblast of the Russian Federation. During the “Cold War” 
it fulfilled only the role of a military base for the Soviet Baltic Fleet. After the collapse of the Eastern Bloc 
Russian exclave became a open region to cooperation with other countries, both on the regional and local 
levels. Attempts to create in Kaliningrad Oblast Russian “Hong Kong on the Baltic Sea” have not yielded 
results so far. But on the other hand, the Russian exclave is no longer seen solely through the prism of mili-
tary factors. Poland and other countries in the region do not question the current political and legal status of 
the Kaliningrad Oblast. Increasingly they see it more through the prism of cooperation in the Baltic region, 
rather than as a source of danger. Changes in relations between NATO, the European Union and the Russian 
Federation could be affected not only on the shape of future European order, but also on changing the role of 
the Kaliningrad Oblast in Polish-Russian relations.
From the perspective of Polish foreign policy Kaliningrad Oblast should become an area of closer coop-
eration with the European Union and NATO (See: De Sousa, 2012). Important element of this cooperation 
should be the economy, transport infrastructure, science and cooperation in the field of soft-security and 
environmental protection.
It is quite often underlined that Polish foreign policy should not see Kaliningrad Oblast by prism of con-
frontation, fears, negative stereotypes. Such attitude would lead to the to a new “Iron Curtain” at the north-
eastern border of Poland and isolation of this territory. The developing close ties with Kaliningrad Oblast 
by cross-border cooperation should ensure political, economic and social stability in the region (Żukowski, 
2004).
The following conclusions were made after undergoing the analysis of the role of Kaliningrad Oblast in 
Polish foreign policy after 1989:
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•	 Kaliningrad was not one of the main priorities of Polish diplomacy, it was not also a priority in 
Polish-Russian relations;
•	 Russian exclave in the first half of the 90s was perceived by the Polish government largely through 
the prism of military threats;
•	 Poland treated Kaliningrad Oblast as an important issue for the development of security and stability 
in the Baltic Sea region;
•	 In its relations with the Russian exclave Poland drew particular attention to the development of 
cross-border cooperation and introduction of local border traffic is a good example;
•	 Polish-Russian border cooperation has been largely conditioned by the state of political relations at 
the interstate;
•	 Kaliningrad began to play a greater role in the Polish foreign policy the time before the Polish ac-
cession to the European Union, which was caused by problems related to the introduction of visas 
for Russians.
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Santrauka
Vertinant geopolitinę situaciją, šiaurės-rytų Lenkijos regionai (vaivadijos) turi didelį potencialą plėtoti 
bendradarbiavimą per sieną. Šis tarptautinis aktyvumas gali turėti įtakos regiono vystymuisi. Lenkijos valdžia 
– centrinė, regioninė ar vietinė – inicijuoja, remia ir finansuoja pasienio bendradarbiavimo projektus, kurie 
skirti skatinti integraciją, geresnį kaimyninių šalių pažinimą ir bendradarbiavimą abipus sienų. Atsižvelgiant 
į Lenkijos užsienio politikos tikslus, tai yra ilgalaikės Šiaurės-Rytų Lenkijos regiono vystymosi strategijos 
pagrindas: dėl geografinės situacijos ir dėl to, kad turi patirties bendradarbiaujant su Kaliningrado sritimi 
(Rusijos Federacija). Be to, užmegzti instituciniai kontaktai: vykdomos tarpvyriausybinės sutartys, sudary-
tos Euroregionų sutartys, sutartys tarp paskirų regionų ir vietinių valdžios atstovų. Tyrimu nustatyta, kad 
bendradarbiavimas per sieną tarp Warmijos ir Mazūrijos regiono ir Kaliningrado srities galėtų būti svarbi 
Lenkijos užsienio politikos dalis bendradarbiaujant su Rusijos Federacija, tačiau tam dėmesio labai trūksta.
PAGRINDINIAI ŽODŽIAI: bendradarbiavimas per sieną, Kaliningrado sritis, Warmijos ir Mazūrijos 
regionas, Lenkijos užsienio politika, Lenkijos ir Rusijos santykiai.
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